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ABSTRACT
There is little causal evidence on the effect of economic and policy outcomes on voting behavior.
This paper uses randomized outcomes from a school choice lottery to examine if lottery outcomes
affect voting behavior in a school board election. We show that losing the lottery has no significant
impact on overall voting behavior; however, among white families, those with above median income
and prior voting history, lottery losers were significantly more likely to vote than lottery winners.
Using propensity score methods, we compare the voting of lottery participants to similar families
who did not participate in the lottery.  We find that losing the school choice lottery caused an
increase  in  voter  turnout  among  whites,  while  winning  the  lottery  had  no  effect  relative  to
non-participants.  Overall,  our  empirical  results  lend  support  to  models  of  expressive  and
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1  Introduction 
 
What motivates citizens to vote?  Understanding the factors that influence voting 
behavior is a central issue in political economy and public finance. Political platforms, 
campaign tactics, and public policy are all affected by voter behavior. Furthermore, the 
funding of critical public goods such as public education is often directly determined by 
ballot box outcomes. Consequently, the way in which economic outcomes influence voter 
turnout and voting behavior has important implications for understanding electoral 
politics, the provision of public goods, and equilibrium welfare in a democratic system.   
Because the marginal impact of any one individual’s voting decision is likely to 
be much smaller than the cost of participating (Downs (1957), Olson (1965), Palfrey and 
Rosenthal (1985), and Feddersen (2004)), researchers have turned to empirical estimation 
to examine the determinants of voting. There is a significant literature using 
observational data to link economic and policy outcomes with voting behavior (Kramer 
(1971), Bloom and Price (1975), and Kinder and Kiewiet (1979)). Many of these papers 
use macroeconomic outcomes and national election results to test models of retrospective 
voting; where voters punish or reward incumbents for past performance. Because 
economic indicators are correlated with other factors that may affect elections, a more 
recent line of research has focused on randomized field experiments to identify the 
factors that affect voting behavior. For example, Gerber and Green (2000) randomized 
get-out-the-vote efforts such as door-to-door canvassing, to test if appeals to civic duty, 
the closeness of the election, or neighborhood solidarity cause people to vote. They find 
convincing evidence that canvassing efforts significantly increase voter turnout. While 
these experiments carry the force of causal identification, they cannot test how policy or 
economic outcomes impact voter decisions.  
In this paper, we present new evidence on voter turnout using a unique policy 
experiment that randomized economic outcomes across potential voters.  We use school 
district administrative data and voter registration data for families in Mecklenburg 
County, North Carolina (which includes the city of Charlotte, North Carolina). In 2002, 
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school district (CMS) implemented a district-wide school 
choice plan after its race-based bussing plan was terminated by the courts. Under the   4
choice plan, parents in the district submitted their top three choices of schools for their 
children, and the district assigned students to schools through a lottery system. We match 
administrative data on students’ choices, lottery numbers, demographics, and school 
assignments to voter records from the Mecklenburg County Board of Elections for the 
school board election immediately following the implementation of the school choice 
plan. We test if losing or winning the lottery to attend one’s first-choice school affected 
the decision to vote. Since lottery outcomes were randomly assigned, they are orthogonal 
to other factors that may influence voting behavior, such as past voting behavior, income, 
or a person’s political views.  
We find that, on average, school admissions decisions had no significant impact 
on the decision to vote. However, among white families, those with the highest voter 
participation rates, lottery losers were significantly more likely to vote in the ensuing 
school board election than lottery winners.  The effect among whites is large in 
magnitude: losing the lottery increases the odds of voting by 38.7% relative to winning. 
This corresponds to a 7 percentage point increase in voter turnout. We then test if this 
differential effect of losing the lottery relative to winning the lottery is consistent with an 
increase in voter turnout for lottery losers or a decrease in turnout for lottery winners. In 
order to do so, we identify a group of students who were not lottery participants and were 
the least affected by the introduction of the school choice plan. The voting behavior of 
these “status-quo” families serves as a measure of voting behavior in the absence of 
positive or negative school choice lottery outcomes. We use propensity score estimates to 
re-weight the sample of status-quo students, balancing the distribution of baseline 
characteristics across the status-quo and lottery groups. Regression results indicate that 
losing the school choice lottery led to an increase in voter turnout among white families 
relative to those unaffected by the lottery, while winning the lottery had no effect on 
voting behavior.    
Our findings are broadly consistent with randomized field trials of get-out-the-
vote efforts, which have found effects of similar magnitude from door-to-door canvassing 
efforts.   As in our results, that work suggest larger effects among regular voters in 
municipal elections (Green and Gerber, 2004). Overall, our empirical results lend support 
to models of expressive and retrospective voting, where likely voters are motivated to   5
vote by past negative policy outcomes (Bloom and Price, 1975). They may do so because 
of the gain in utility from expressing frustration (a form of expressive voting) or to 
punish incumbent for past negative outcomes (a form of retrospective voting where 
punishment of the incumbent motivates turnout more than reward does). The results are 
also consistent with Hirshman’s (1970) idea of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in consumer 
responses to firm behavior. When faced with a monopolist provider of a product without 
close substitutes, such as a public school district, consumers may voice frustration with 
the product, here at district officials through school board elections, since they cannot 
easily exit by switching to an alternative supplier.   
This paper proceeds in four sections. The first section reviews the relevant 
literature. The second section describes the details of the CMS choice plan and lottery, 
which is followed by a discussion of the school board election and the voter registration 
data. The fourth section describes the data and presents the results.  The final section 
concludes.   
 
2  Literature Review 
 
The expected impact of any individual’s vote on an election outcome is likely to be 
much smaller than the cost of participating (Downs (1957), Olson (1965), Palfrey and 
Rosenthal (1985), and Feddersen (2004)), creating difficulty in motivating voting as the 
result of a personal cost-benefit trade-off. This paradox of not voting had led to a growing 
empirical literature examining other factors that influence voting behavior. George and 
Waldfogel (2002), Gentzkow (2006), and DellaVigna and Kaplan (2006) study the 
effects of media exposure on voter turnout. George and Waldfogel (2002) find that an 
increase in the circulation of the New York Times is correlated with a decline in the 
readership of local newspapers as well as the probability of voting in local elections by 
college-educated individuals relative to others.  Similarly, Gentzkow (2006) finds that the 
introduction of television led to declines in newspaper readership, radio listening, 
political awareness, and voter turnout, with the largest effects in local elections. Finally, 
DellaVigna and Kaplan (2006) find a positive effect on voter turnout in towns where the 
Fox News Channel had entered by the time of the election.   6
 
A second line of research has focused on field experiments to investigate reasons for 
voter turnout. Gerber and Green (2000) use field experiments with random assignment of 
get-out-the-vote canvassing to examine what motivates voting. They find that door-to-
door canvassing has a significant impact on voter turnout and is much more effective than 
alternative get-out-the-vote methods such as phone calls. In addition, the authors vary the 
canvassing treatment to test different voting motivations, randomly appealing to i) a 
sense of civic duty, ii) an importance for welfare of local community (community 
solidarity), and iii) a statement of a ‘close election’ aimed at affecting the subject’s 
perception of the probability of swinging the election. They find the strength of estimated 
impact on voter turnout was 9.1, 5.1, and 12.1 percentage points, respectively, lending 
suggestive evidence that an increased chance of being pivotal has the strongest impact on 
voting behavior, although the estimates are not statistically significantly different. Green 
and Gerber (2004) provide a summary of empirical evidence from voter mobilization 
field experiments.  
There is little evidence on the effect of economic and policy outcomes on voter 
behavior, in part because it is difficult to identify exogenous sources of variation in these 
outcomes. Green (2005) studies the impact of PROGRESA, a government transfer 
program in Mexico aimed at poor rural neighborhoods, on community-level voting 
behavior. In order to identify the effect, she exploits discontinuities in a community’s 
propensity to be enrolled in PROGRESA. Green does not find evidence that PROGRESA 
significantly affected community voter turnout or the fraction of votes for the incumbent.  
  There is a recent literature using school choice lotteries and randomized voucher 
experiments to identify the impact of school choice on student outcomes (Hastings, Kane, 
and Staiger (2006a,c), Cullen, Jacob, and Levitt (2003), Mayer, et al. (2002), Krueger and 
Zhu (2004), and Rouse (1998)). Instead of focusing on student outcomes, our paper uses 
randomized school admissions generated by a school choice lottery to estimate how being 
given access to a better school influences parents’ decision to vote. As far as we know, 
this is the first analysis of the causal effect of randomly assigned economic outcomes on 
subsequent voting behavior.  The link between school choice and voter behavior is of 
direct interest, in that it determines implicit incentives for politicians that may prevent   7
efficient adoption of school choice programs.  A few papers have found that higher 
income homeowners with access to better schools oppose school voucher ballot 
initiatives (Brunner, Sonstelie, and Thayer (2001) and Brunner and Sonstelie (2003)), but 
none of these studies involved random assignment or were able to evaluate whether the 
actual impact of the policy influenced voting behavior.  
 
 
3  The CMS School Choice Plan 
 
3.1  School Choices 
 
For three decades the Charlotte-Mecklenburg public school district (CMS) bused 
students to assigned schools to achieve racial integration. In September 2001, the U.S. 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals declared the school district “unitary” and ordered the 
district to dismantle the race-based student assignment plan by the beginning of the next 
school year. As a consequence the school district moved to implement a new district-
wide public school choice plan to replace the bussing system beginning in the 2002-2003 
school year.  
   In the spring of 2002, parents were asked to submit their top three choices of 
school programs for each child. Each student was assigned a “home school” in her 
neighborhood, typically her closest school, and was guaranteed admission to this school 
if she was not admitted to any of her top three choices. Students were similarly 
guaranteed admission to continue in magnet programs in which they were enrolled in 
Spring 2002. Admission to non-guaranteed schools was determined by a lottery system 
described further in the next section.  After the first year of the choice plan, parents with 
children in rising grades, parents entering CMS, and any parents who wished to change 
their child’s school were required to submit choice forms in a similar manner. Again 
admission to oversubscribed schools was assigned by lottery. Students who were in non-
rising grades and had already sorted into one of their preferred schools in the first year of 
school choice did not have to submit a choice form if they wished to stay where they   8
were.  In each year, CMS had near perfect compliance; approximately 95% of parents 
who were required to submit a choice form did so.  
The implementation of the school choice program resulted in a large redistricting 
of home school assignments. Prior to choice, school assignment zones were drawn to 
capture non-contiguous black and white neighborhoods to achieve racial balance.  With 
the introduction of the choice plan, families were assigned to a default school in their 
neighborhood. As a result, approximately 50 percent of parcels lost property rights to the 
school they were assigned to under the bussing plan. The introduction of the school 
choice plan was intended to provide more educational options to parents. The initial 
school choice plan was to stay in effect for 3 years (through 2005-2006 school year), at 
which time there would be an extensive review of the choice system allowing for public 
comment and discussion.   
We were given secure access to administrative data including the choice response 
forms for the first two years of school choice. For each school year, the school choice 
response forms were submitted in the spring of the prior school year. For example, 
choices for the 2002-2003 school year were submitted in Spring 2002, and choices for the 
2003-2004 school year were submitted in Spring 2003. For each of these school lotteries, 
we have the choice response forms and demographic information including geographic 




3.2  Lottery Assignments 
 
In the first school choice lottery, every student was required to submit a choice 
form to CMS.  As described earlier, each student was assigned a new neighborhood 
school, at which they were given a guaranteed seat. If a student chose this new ‘home 
school’ as her first choice, she was guaranteed admission. Many students did not list their 
home school for any of their three choices.
2 Our analysis will focus on students who did 
                                                 
1 The remaining 5% of students did not submit choice forms even though they were required to. CMS 
officials then assigned them to their guaranteed neighborhood school. 
2 Please see Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2006b) for a detailed description of the choices and how they 
varied in the student population.   9
not choose their guaranteed home school, whose admission to their first-choice school 
was determined by lottery number.  
In the second year school choice lottery, only students who were in rising grades, 
new to CMS, or affected by changes in home school boundaries resulting from the 
opening of new schools were required to submit choice forms. If a non-rising grade 
student wished to continue at her current school (the school she was admitted to after the 
first year of school choice assignments), she was not required to submit a choice form. 
Hence from the second year of lottery assignments, we will again only use those students 
who chose a non-guaranteed school as their first choice, and hence had an admission 
status determined by the school choice lottery. Across the two years of lottery choices, 
slightly over half of the students submitting choice forms chose their guaranteed school, 
and the remaining students chose a school for which they were not guaranteed admission.  
Admission of students to non-home choices was limited by grade-specific 
capacities set by the district.  In the first year of school choice, the district allowed 
significant increases in enrollment at high-demand schools in an effort to give each child 
one of her top three choices. As a result, approximately 95% of students in the first year 
of choice received admission to one of their top three choices. School capacities were not 
expanded in the second year of school choice; however, parents were not informed of this 
policy change prior to submitting choices.  
  Approximately one third of the schools in the district were oversubscribed in the 
first year, and approximately two thirds of schools were oversubscribed in the second 
year. The district implemented a lottery system for determining enrollments in those 
oversubscribed schools.  Under the lottery system, students choosing non-home schools 
were first assigned to priority groups and student admission was then determined by a 
lottery number. The priority groups for district schools were arranged in the following 
lexicographic order: 
 
Priority 1:  Student who had attended the school in the prior year. (Students were 
subdivided into 3 priority groups depending upon their grade level, with 
students in terminal grades—grades 5, 8 and 12—given highest priority.)   10
Priority 2:  Free- or reduced-lunch eligible student applying to school where less than 
half the students were free- or reduced-lunch eligible. 
Priority 3:  Student applying to a school within her geographic Choice Zone.
3 
 
Under the lottery system, students listing a given school as their first choice were 
sorted by priority group and a randomly assigned lottery number.
4  Slots remaining after 
home school students’ first choices were accounted for were assigned in order of priority 
group and random number.
5  If a school was not filled by those who had listed it as a first 
choice, the lottery would repeat the process with those listing the school as a second 
choice, using the same priority groups as above. 
Students who were not assigned one of their top choices were placed on a waiting 
list. About 19% of students winning the lottery to attend their first-choice schools 
subsequently attended a different school, with 13% choosing to attend their home school 
instead and another 6% choosing to attend a different school entirely, with most of these 
students changing address. When slots became available, students were taken off the wait 
list based on their lottery number alone, without regard for their priority group. 
This system of assigning students to schools effectively splits parents into two 
groups.  If parents selected their home school as their first choice, they knew they were 
guaranteed admission. If parents selected a non-guaranteed school, they knew that 
admission would be assigned by lottery if the school were over subscribed.  This second 
group learned whether they were admitted or not to their first-choice school at the end of 
the school assignment period, but did not learn the reason for being admitted (e.g., 
because of a high priority, because of a high lottery number, or because the school was 
not over-subscribed). Thus, from the parents’ perspective, being admitted to any non-
                                                 
3 The county was split into four geographic Choice Zones. A student could choose any school in any 
Choice Zone; however, bussing would only be provided by the district to schools within the student’s 
Choice Zone. 
4 The random number was assigned by a computer using an algorithm that we verified with CMS computer 
programmers. Parents do not know their lottery numbers. They submit their choice forms to CMS, who 
assigns a random number to each submission and then communicates outcomes to parents once the lottery 
assignment algorithm is run.  
5 Once any sibling was admitted to a school, other siblings could choose to attend the school. In other 
words, if two siblings list the same school as their first choice, their lottery number is effectively set to the 
minimum of their individual lottery numbers. We dropped those who were admitted to a school because of 
a sibling preference.   11
guaranteed school was the result of winning a lottery – even though lottery numbers 
played no role in determining admission for many priorty groups.  
 
 
4  The Election and Voter Registration Data 
 
4.1  The November 2003 School Board Election 
 
On November 4, 2003, Mecklenburg County voters went to the polls to vote in 
elections for local officials including the three at-large school board members.
6  The 
CMS school board is composed of nine members: three at-large members and one 
member for each of six sub-districts. All board members are elected to four-year terms 
with at-large members and district members elected in an alternating cycle every two 
years. The school board decides on goals and policies for CMS including funding 
initiatives and bond measures, new school sites, and funding allocation.  The school 
board also appoints the Superintendent, who runs the daily operation of the school district 
and implements the board’s policy.  
  Of the three at-large board members up for re-election, two did not seek re-
election.  The one member who did seek re-election was also the sitting chair of the 
school board. Table I shows the names and occupations, and describes the platforms of 
the candidates for the three at-large seats, as well as the total votes cast for each 
candidate. The three candidates with the most votes are elected as at-large members, and 
typically serve as the school board chair and vice chairs.
7   
  Two items in Table I are important to note. First, the sitting chair was not re-
elected, losing by a small margin. Second, based on the official platforms of the 
candidates, changing the school choice system was not one of the foremost campaign 
issues. Instead, the winning candidates focused on traditional issues such as budget 
streamlining and funding increases, improving quality and retention of teachers, and 
                                                 
6 Other offices up for election included mayor and city council.  
7  Source: Charlotte Advocates for Education voting guide. The Chair and Vice-Chair serve one-year terms 
and are not necessarily at-large members.   12
improving student achievement in general.
8  One reason for this may have been that the 
old regime of bussing for integration was outlawed by the courts, and the district had 
made a three-year commitment to the school choice plan before conducting a review 
process and discussing potential changes. In addition, since most residents received their 
first-choice school in the first year of choice, many constituents may have been satisfied 
with the choice system, and more concerned with other issues such as funding, growth, 
and education improvement.  
 
4.2  Mecklenburg County Voter Registration Data 
 
The November 2003 elections followed directly after the first school year under 
school choice, and after the first two school choice lotteries and assignments had been 
made. Figure 1 presents a timeline of events. The Mecklenburg County Board of 
Elections keeps voter registration data with demographic information and past voting 
history for up to 20 elections for every registered voter in Mecklenburg County. The data 
are updated continuously as new voters register and as current voters change addresses 
within county. We were able to obtain an older version of the voter registration file that 
was inadvertently preserved from March 2004. This data set includes the full name, 
address, ethnicity, gender, party affiliation, date of last address change, and voting history 
for every registered voter in Mecklenburg County as of March 2004. The addresses from 
this file were geocoded by the Board of Elections, giving us precise longitude and 
latitude coordinates for each registered resident. Since most moving occurs during the 
spring-fall months, the March 2004 geocoded data provide fairly accurate information on 
voters and their locations in November 2003 at the time of the election. 
Table II describes the demographics of registered voters and those who cast 
ballots in the November 2003 election. Based on demographic information for the county 
                                                 
8 The one candidate to mention issues related to the school choice plan was Mr. Mike Kasper who stated 
one primary objective was to establish ‘Neighborhood Schools Zones’ that are permanent. This platform 
was directed at the high-growth and wealthy southern districts within CMS who had experienced several 
home school boundary changes with the opening of new schools over the past 10 years: both before and 
after the school choice plan was implemented. Some parents in those communities wanted to have more 
stability in their designated neighborhood school as new schools were opened. This area is largely affluent 
and white – the group of citizens who are traditionally most likely to vote.     13
as a whole, whites are more likely to be registered and are more likely to have voted if 
they are registered. Moreover, registered voters have on average significantly higher 
incomes than the county-wide population average, where income is measured by the 
median household income for residents of the voter’s own race living in the voter’s own 
block group as reported by the 2000 Decennial Census. Of registered voters, those 
actually casting ballots in the 2003 election were again wealthier than the average 
registered voter. In addition, voters registered as Independent or Libertarian (not 
Republican or Democrat) were less likely to cast ballots in the election than those who 
were registered as Republican or Democrat. 
 
5  Estimating the Impact of Lottery Outcomes on the Decision to Vote 
 
5.1  Defining the Randomized Sample of Lottery Participants 
 
We use the school lottery outcomes to create treatment and control groups.  We 
focus on the subset of students choosing schools that were over-subscribed. We then limit 
our sample to students in randomized groups, that is, those priority groups for which 
admissions to the first-choice schools were determined solely on the basis of a random 
number. Recall from Section 3.2 that admissions to oversubscribed schools were 
determined by the concatenation of a priority number, which depended on student and 
school specific factors such as free- and reduced-lunch status, and a randomly generated 
lottery number. We ignore members of priority groups in which all students were either 
admitted or denied admission—since the assignment of lottery numbers had no impact on 
their admission status. Hence, for all students in the analysis, the randomly generated 
lottery number solely determined admission to the first-choice school within each school 
choice and grade combination. In some schools, the randomized group will consist of 
students who attended the school the year before, or free- or reduced-lunch eligible 
students, or students from the Choice Zone. The randomized group may also be different 
for different grade levels in a school.  
We began with the choice forms submitted by 105,706 students in the first year, 
and 33,530 students in the second year.  After dropping students who had special   14
disabilities needs and students who were admitted because of siblings, we were left with 
a sample 92,789 in the first year and 29,104 in the second year of data.  Of these, 
approximately 60% in the first year and 51% in the second year listed their guaranteed 
school as their first choice and were therefore not subject to randomization. We then 
further excluded students within priority groups that were sufficiently high or low so that 
all members of the priority group were admitted or excluded from admission to their first-
choice school and grade combination.  This left us with 10,174 students in randomized 
groups: 6,931 students from the first lottery year and 3,243 students from the second 
lottery year.   
Of the 10,174 students in randomized groups, we excluded 62 students (124 
observations) who were in randomized groups for both lottery years but won one lottery 
and lost the other. We further excluded 98 students who were graduating seniors in the 
2002-2003 school year since they were not enrolled in CMS in the following year (after 
graduation) making it impossible to link them to voter registration files based on home 
address in fall of 2003. In addition, following Hastings, Kane, and Staiger (2006a,c), we 
further exclude 351 inactive students in the randomized groups. Inactive students are 
students who reside in Mecklenburg County but do not receive schooling through CMS at 
the time they submit their school choice application. These include current private school 
or home school students who participate in the lottery in order to potentially gain 
admission to a public school they would prefer to their current alternative. We drop the 
inactive students because (like the seniors) they were unlikely to be enrolled in CMS and 
provide a home address in the fall of 2003, particularly if they lost the lottery to attend 
their first-choice school.  Finally, we drop an additional 193 students with missing 
baseline information. 
Table III shows the characteristics of the remaining 9,408 students in randomized 
groups versus the characteristics of all students in CMS. Students in randomized groups 
are slightly more likely to be African American and slightly more likely to be recipients 
of federal lunch subsidies.  In addition, they come from guaranteed school assignment 
zones with significantly lower than average test score outcomes. However, they chose 
schools with higher than average standardized test score results. School test scores are 
calculated as the average of the student-level standardized test scores for students   15
attending each school program. The student-level test scores are standardized by the 
district-wide mean and variance within each grade.   
 
5.2  Matching Student Data to Voter Registration Data 
 
Within the randomized groups, we would like to estimate the impact of winning 
the lottery to attend a first-choice school on the decision to vote. Therefore, we must first 
match the voter registration data to the lottery outcome data.  We have geocoded 
locations for students and voters, as well as street address and full name for students and 
street addresses and full names for registered voters from the voter data. We use the 
student locations provided to us in the Fall 2003 student census, which the district uses to 
create the official enrollment lists for federal and state funding. The census is taken on 
the 20
th day of the school year - approximately at the end of September 2003. This gives 
us address information as close as possible to the actual election date. We use these 
geocoded residential locations to create matches between students and registered voters 
in the voting file.  
Student locations were geocoded by the district at the center of the housing parcel, 
while the voter registration data were geocoded to the middle of the street in front of the 
residence. Hence the geocodes did not perfectly overlap across the two data files. In order 
to match voters to students, we created small geographic circles around each student, and 
pulled off all voters that fell within that geographic radius. Within each geographic 
radius, we then matched voters to students by matching on exact street address and exact 
last name. This resulted in approximately 90% of our overall matches. We then examined 
the remaining students, creating matches for those with hyphenated last names and those 
with slight name misspellings (e.g. McDowell vs. MacDowell), still requiring a match on 
geography and street address. Those students with no match are then counted as having 
no registered voters in their household.  
 
5.3  Attrition 
   16
Lottery outcomes are from the spring of 2002 and 2003, while voter data is based 
on residential location in the fall of 2003. Some students in randomized groups have left 
CMS by the fall of 2003, and for these students the voter data is missing leading to 
potential attrition bias. Of the 9,408 students in randomized groups, 8,085 remained 
enrolled in CMS by the fall of 2003 for an average attrition rate of just over 14%.
9 Table 
IV presents results comparing attrition across lottery winners and lottery losers from a 
regression of an indicator of whether a student was not present in CMS in the fall of 2003 
on an indicator of whether she won the lottery, controlling for baseline characteristics and 
school choice and grade (lottery-block) fixed effects.
10 Among all students, lottery 
winners were less likely to attrit than lottery losers. This differential attrition was quite 
small in magnitude and insignificant in either lottery year individually but was significant 
in the pooled randomized sample. Columns 2 and 3 present the differential attrition rates 
for lottery losers versus lottery winners by race. The differential attrition is higher for 
whites than for non-whites and significant for whites in the pooled sample as well as 
among 2002-2003 lottery participants. For non-whites, differential attrition is near zero 
and insignificant for all lottery groups. Overall, the low rates of attrition in this sample 
minimize the possibility that the initial randomization is biased by systematically missing 
data from attriters.  To the extent that lottery losers who leave CMS may have been 
particularly angry (and therefore most likely to vote), their somewhat higher rates of 
attrition would act, if anything, to understate voter turnout among those losing the lottery, 
particularly among white families – thus working against our results. 
In order to further verify the validity of the initial randomization in our final 
analysis sample, we compare the baseline characteristics of lottery winners and losers 
among the 8,085 non-attriting students in the randomized groups. Table V reports mean 
baseline characteristics for lottery winners and losers, as well as regression adjusted 
differences from an OLS regression of each baseline characteristic on an indicator of 
whether the student won the lottery as well as fixed effects for the school program and 
                                                 
9 This attrition is reasonably consistent with estimates of inter-county mobility rates from the Census. 
Approximately 6% of school age children living in the South moved to a different county between March 
2002 and March 2003.  Mobility rates tend to be somewhat higher in urban, high-poverty populations 
(Schachter, 2004). 
10 Note that lottery-block fixed effects span priority group fixed effects. We must control for lottery-block 
fixed effects since the odds of admission change across each lottery.    17
grade for which the lottery is being conducted. Before adjusting for lottery block fixed 
effects, there are a few differences in baseline characteristics between lottery winners and 
losers. However, these differences were largely due to a correlation between the 
characteristics of lottery participants and the lottery odds.  After including a fixed effect 
for each school program and grade, all such differences were smaller and were generally 
not significantly different from zero. In particular, the final row of Table V shows that 
prior voting history is not caused by lottery outcomes. The 2001 election was the most 
recent school board election prior to 2003. The exogeneity of lottery outcomes to prior 
voting history is important since prior participation in school board elections is the single 
strongest predictor of future voting behavior. The only characteristic for which there 
remained a statistically significant difference after including the lottery block fixed 
effects was free- and reduced-lunch recipient status. Since admission priorities depended 
in part on a student’s lunch status, there were very few lotteries that had any variation in 
this variable, making this estimated difference somewhat suspect.
11  
 
5.4  Regression Results 
 
Table VI reports the estimates of the effects of losing the lottery relative to 
winning the lottery on voter turnout using a conditional logit specification (Chamberlain 
(1980)) which conditions on choice-grade (lottery-block) fixed effects and student 
baseline demographic characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the choice-grade 
level. The dependent variable is an indicator variable if any person in the student’s 
household voted. For some of the smaller lottery blocks, there is no variation in the 
dependent variable across students. These observations are dropped from the conditional 
logit estimation since they add no information to the likelihood function.  This reduces 
the number of observations in this analysis to 7,365. 
The results presented in Column 1 of Table VI show that, overall, there was no 
significant differential impact of losing versus winning the lottery on voter turnout. 
However, Column 2 shows that among parents of white students, those families that are 
                                                 
11 The results in Table V do not change significantly if we use the full sample of 9,408 students (including 
the attriters) for whom we have student level characteristics (excluding prior voting history).    18
most likely to vote in any election, there is a strong and significant differential impact of 
losing the lottery on voter turnout. In particular, among white voters, losing versus 
winning the lottery increases the odds of voting by approximately 38.7% (exponentiating 
the logit coefficient). Given a 31% voting rate among white lottery winners, this 
translates into a 7 percentage point increase in the voting rate. This is a very strong, but 
not unreasonably strong, impact on voter turnout. For example, the estimated impact is 
approximately as large as the effect of door-to-door canvassing identified in Gerber and 
Green (2000) of 8-9 percentage points (relative to an average voting rate of 45% in their 
sample).  In contrast, there is no significant effect of lottery outcomes on voting in the 
non-white population. Baseline characteristics are included to improve precision of the 
estimates but do not affect the point estimates of the impact of randomly assigned lottery 
outcomes on voter turnout. The baseline coefficients validate correlations in the overall 
voting population: voter turnout is significantly higher among whites, higher-income 
populations, and among citizens who voted in the prior school board election (November 
2001).   
Table VII presents alternative specifications for the relationship between lottery 
outcomes and voting behavior. Columns 1 through 3 present the results from a linear 
probability model using an indicator if someone from the household voted as the 
dependent variable, controlling for baseline characteristics and lottery-block fixed effects. 
The results are similar in sign and magnitude to those presented in the conditional logit 
specification, with losing the lottery significantly increasing voter participation among 
white lottery participants by approximately 5 percentage points.  
Columns 4 through 9 use the total number of people who voted from a student’s 
household as the dependent variable. This measure may more accurately reflect the 
change in total voter turnout caused by losing the lottery; however, because the number 
of adults of voting age present in a household varies with race and income level, it also 
includes in it a family size or marital status component that we do not directly observe. 
Nevertheless, results using the vote count as the dependent variable are similar to those 
based on whether anyone in the household voted, showing significant positive effects of 
losing the lottery on voting among whites. Columns 4 through 6 use a linear specification 
while Columns 7 through 9 use a fixed-effect poisson model for count data (which drops   19
observations in lottery blocks with no voters, yielding a sample of 7,373 observations). 
Across these two specifications, the estimated change in voter turnout for lottery losers 
versus lottery winners is roughly the same. For example, Column 5 shows that the 
number of votes per household increases by .082 among white lottery losers, while 
Column 8 shows the increase at .091 (17.8% increase on a base of 0.51 total voters per 
household). 
 
5.5  Do Lottery Losers Vote More or Do Winners Vote Less? 
 
  The results from Tables VI and VII document a robust positive effect of losing the 
lottery relative to winning the lottery on voter turnout among white lottery participants. 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to generalize these results to lottery participants outside of 
the randomized groups, since parents who applied to non-guaranteed schools were 
unaware of being in the randomized groups and only knew their admission outcome. 
However, by themselves, these lottery results cannot determine whether voter turnout 
increases among lottery losers or decreases among lottery winners.  
 In order to determine if losers vote more or winners vote less (or both), we need a 
counterfactual estimate of voting behavior for families had they been unaffected by the 
school choice lottery. Ideally we would like a set of families who had the same incentives 
to vote as they would have had absent the school choice plan. For example, this could be 
a set of families who were randomly excluded from the choice plan as long as exclusion 
did not cause a change in voting behavior. Since the school choice plan was implemented 
district-wide, and since lottery participation was not randomized, we do not have a 
randomly generated group of excluded families, let alone ones for whom exclusion would 
have no effect on their voting behavior. We can, however, identify families unaffected by 
the policy change who may serve as a reasonable counterfactual for the randomized 
lottery participants. These families are ones who chose their guaranteed school, and for 
whom their guaranteed schools (at all levels) under the choice plan were the same as their 
assigned schools under the previous bussing regime. The school choice plan left these 
families effectively with the same schools that they would have had in the absence of the 
policy change, and we might expect their voting behavior to be the same under the school   20
choice plan and under a counterfactual continued bussing regime. We refer to this group 
of families as the ‘status-quo’ group. Comparing lottery winners and losers (in the 
randomized group) to the status-quo group provides a test of whether losers vote more or 
winners vote less, relative to what would have occurred in the absence of the choice 
plan.
12 
  In order to construct the status-quo group, we took the following steps. First, 
using the boundary changes in school assignment zones that were implemented with the 
school choice plan, we identified families who kept guarantees to all levels of schools for 
which they had guarantees in the 2001-2002 school year and whose children were 
assigned to those schools. These families make our ‘status-quo’ group. There are 7,966 
‘status-quo’ students who had guarantees to and were assigned to the schools and grades 
chosen by students in our randomized groups. 
  Table VIII summarizes differences in baseline characteristics for students in the 
status-quo versus the randomized groups. Columns 1 and 2 present mean characteristics 
for students in the status-quo and randomized groups, respectively, while Column 3 
presents regression adjusted differences in baseline characteristics between the status-quo 
and randomized groups controlling for school choice and grade level (lottery-block) fixed 
effects. Students who have guaranteed rights to attend the chosen schools are 
significantly more likely to be white, less likely to receive federal lunch subsidies, and 
have on average higher neighborhood income levels. Their parents also are much more 
likely to have participated in the prior school board election. Thus there is substantial 
non-overlap in the baseline characteristics that determine voting between the status-quo 
and randomized groups.  
We use a propensity score approach to better match the baseline characteristics of 
the status-quo group to the randomized groups (Hirano, Imbens, and Ridder (2003), 
Barsky et al. (2002), Imbens (2003)). Let the propensity score (P) be the probability that a 
student is in the randomized groups (as opposed to the status-quo group) within each 
                                                 
12 We treat the status-quo families as having neither won nor lost since they did not participate in a gamble, 
and their decision not to participate was mostly caused by predetermined residential location and the 
geographic redistricting that occurred with the choice plan. One may instead argue that these parents 
considered themselves winners just like lottery participants who won admission to a non-guaranteed 
school. In this case, they would not serve as a valid counterfactual for voting behavior in the absence of 
winning or losing the school choice lottery.    21
chosen school as a function of baseline characteristics. We re-weight observations in the 
status-quo sample by P/(1-P), which balances their distribution of baseline characteristics 
with the randomized group within each chosen school. To construct the propensity score, 
we estimate a separate probit for each chosen school, controlling for free- and reduced-
lunch status, white, female, median income, median income squared, and an indicator if 
someone from the household voted in the 2001 election.
13 We dropped students in 
schools for which the number of students in either the randomized or status-quo group 
was less than 10 or in schools in which being in the randomized group was perfectly 
predicted by observable characteristics. This dropped 553 students from the randomized 
groups and 1,510 students from the potential pool of status-quo students. Baseline 
conditional logit estimates of the effect of losing the lottery on voter turnout were similar 
after dropping these students.  
 The final column of Table VIII presents the regression adjusted difference in 
baseline characteristics between the randomized groups and the status-quo group, using 
the propensity score to re-weight the status-quo group. In contrast to the un-weighted 
difference in the previous column, there is no significant difference in baseline 
characteristics between the randomized and status-quo groups in the re-weighted sample. 
Thus, re-weighting based on the propensity score yields a (weighted) status-quo sample 
that is much better matched to the randomized sample in terms of observable 
characteristics.  Using these weights, we can estimate the average treatment effect of 
losing the lottery and winning the lottery on voter turnout relative to a comparable status-
quo group.    
  Table IX presents weighted estimates of the effect of losing the lottery or being in 
the status-quo group on voting behavior, relative to winning the lottery. Because our 
weights vary within lottery-block (the fixed-effect level), we cannot use the conditional 
logit specification, so we focus on the linear probability model instead. The excluded 
group is lottery winners. Columns 1 through 6 present results using the same 
specification as those in Table VII, Columns 1 through 6, adding the status-quo group of 
                                                 
13 Note that estimating separately for the sample of students choosing each school adds considerable 
flexibility to the probit, and saturates the propensity score model without saturating the model of interest. 
Estimating the propensity score using one probit for the entire sample of students (thus excluding the 
interactions with school chosen) and controlling for lottery-block fixed effects did not sufficiently balance 
baseline characteristics between the status quo and randomized groups within lottery block.   22
students and estimating by weighted least squares (with the status-quo group weighted as 
discussed above). As before, the coefficient on losing the lottery is positive and 
significant for whites in both Columns 2 and 5. However, across all columns, the voting 
behavior of the status-quo group is statistically the same as that of the lottery winners. 
These estimates suggest that losing the lottery causes an increase in voter turnout among 
white families, while winning the lottery causes no change in turnout relative to status-
quo voting behavior. 
5.6  Alternative Specifications 
 
Our empirical evidence suggests that losing the school choice lottery leads to 
increased voter turnout amongst white families. However, income and prior voting 
history are both highly correlated with race. Evidence on voter response to randomized 
get-out-the-vote campaigns suggests that prior voters are the most likely to respond to 
canvassing efforts in municipal and local elections (Green and Gerber (2004), p. 37).   
Table X presents estimates from specifications that include interactions between 
losing the lottery and each of these baseline characteristics. As in Tables VI and VII, 
these specifications are estimated using only the students in the randomized group. 
Column 1 shows that the effect of losing the lottery on voter turnout is increasing in 
income and that the interaction with race becomes insignificant once this interaction is 
included. Income is measured as the median income for households in student i’s block 
group of student i’s race demeaned by the county-wide median income of $51,000 and 
divided by 1,000.  Hence, these coefficients imply that losing the lottery has no impact on 
voting at incomes of around $40,000 but increases the odds of voting by over 50% at 
incomes in the $100,000-$150,000 range.  Column 2 adds an interaction between prior 
voting history and lottery outcomes. The coefficient on the interaction between voting 
history and losing the lottery is positive and significant indicating that, among probable 
voters (with median income), losing the lottery increased the odds of voting by 41% (an 8 
percentage point increase off of a base of 67% for probable voters who won the lottery). 
The coefficient on income interacted with lottery outcomes remains unchanged. Hence, 
the asymmetric effect of losing the lottery on voter turnout is more likely a function of 
income and past voting history than it is of race.    23
  The final two columns of Table X allow the effect of losing the lottery on voter 
turnout to be a function of the difference in the quality of the child’s first-choice school 
and the child’s neighborhood school, where quality is measured by the average 
standardized test score for students in the school. The majority of students who did not 
win admission to their first-choice school were admitted to their neighborhood school, 
and one might expect a larger impact on voting if students were denied access to a school 
with much higher test scores than their neighborhood school. Column 3 of Table X shows 
an insignificant coefficient on the interaction between losing the lottery and the score gap 
between the first-choice and home school. Column 4 of Table X breaks the interaction 
between losing the lottery and the score gap into two terms to further test if those who 
experienced losses in academics were more likely to vote. The first term is the difference 
between the first-choice school score and the last year’s school score if the family 
received admission to their first-choice school (the academic gain), while the second term 
is the difference between the home school score and the last-year’s school score in the 
event that the family lost the lottery (the academic loss). This alternative specification of 
the relative importance of improving education for lottery losers and lottery winners does 
not yield significant results either.  Hence, the impact of losing the lottery on voting does 
not appear to be a function of the difference in the test scores between the child’s first-
choice school and the child’s neighborhood school. 
 
5.7   Precinct-Level Outcomes 
 
If the current results are generated by the desire to voice frustration or 
retrospectively punish incumbents for negative policy outcomes, we might expect lottery 
losers to turn out against the incumbent school board chair. Unfortunately, with 
individual-level data, we cannot say anything about how people voted, only whether or 
not they voted. Nevertheless, we can examine the cross-sectional relationship between 
the precinct fraction of votes against the incumbent and the fraction of families who were 
negatively impacted by losing the school choice lottery.  
Our approach is as follows. Mecklenburg County had 190 precincts at the time of 
the 2003 election. We first use geocoded student locations and precinct boundary files to   24
determine the precinct that each family lived in. Using the school assignment outcomes, 
we categorize students as losing the lottery if they did not gain admission to their first-
choice school.  Thus, we assume that voting behavior among all families that lost the 
lottery was similar to what we estimated using the randomized groups. Our results in 
Table VI imply that the voting behavior of white families changed as a result of losing 
the lottery. Therefore, we generate the fraction of students in each precinct who were 
white and who were denied admission to their first choice school, as well as precinct-
level averages of student characteristics that might affect election results. Table XI 
presents results for regressions in which the dependent variable is the precinct-level 
fraction of voters who did not vote for the incumbent (i.e., (#voters - #votes for 
incumbent)/#voters). The key independent variable is the fraction of students living in the 
precinct who were white and had lost the lottery. While this approach does not carry the 
force of randomized assignment, it is helpful to see if election results by precinct are 
consistent with our prediction that losing the school choice lottery moved the election 
results against the incumbent.   
Columns 1 through 3 present regression results with various added controls. The 
first column controls only for the precinct-level share of voters not voting for the 
incumbent in the prior election (1999). Note that 4 precincts were not present in 1999, so 
our sample size declines to 186 when we add this control. The coefficient is highly 
significant and close to 1. The precinct fraction of white families who lost the school 
choice lottery is positive and highly significant with a coefficient of 0.437. The second 
column adds controls for additional precinct-average student characteristics. The size and 
significance of the coefficient on fraction of students who were white and lost the lottery 
is similar across the two specifications. Column 3 adds fixed effects for the 6 School 
Board Districts. Each of these districts is represented by a school board member. 
Although these members were not up for re-election (recall only the at-large members 
were on the ballot), it may be the case the voter behavior differs across these districts. 
Adding these variables decreases the significance of the coefficient of interest to the 10% 
level, but it does not change the point estimate significantly. Taken as a whole, the results 
in Table XI suggest that lottery losers who were likely voters turned out at the polls and 
voted against the incumbent school board chair.    25
 
6  Conclusion 
 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the factors that influence the decision 
to vote by using a unique policy experiment that randomized economic outcomes across 
potential voters. Overall we do not find a significant effect of losing the school choice 
lottery on voter turnout. However, losing the school choice lottery significantly increased 
the probability of voting in the ensuing school board election among likely voters – 
whites or high income households that voted in the prior election. The significant impact 
of losing the lottery among likely voters is consistent with results from door-to-door 
canvassing experiments (Green and Gerber (2004)), which find that canvassing and get-
out-the-vote efforts have greater effects on regular voters than on infrequent voters, 
particularly in low turnout elections such as municipal elections. This paper adds further 
evidence on the motivation to vote by examining the impact of actual economic 
outcomes, exploiting randomization generated by public policy.  
The empirical results suggest an asymmetric effect: losing the school choice 
lottery led to increased voter turnout among likely voters, but winning the lottery did not 
seem to have an effect on voting behavior. These results are consistent with retrospective 
and expressive models of voting behavior, where negative outcomes motivate more than 
positive outcomes do. It is also consistent with Hirschman’s (1970) ideas of Exit, Voice, 
and Loyalty. In a monopoly product market, like public education, consumers (parents) 
may not be able to easily exit in response to dissatisfaction with firm product quality or 
firm policy. When exit is not possible, the primary means to express frustration and 
dissatisfaction is through voice, which in this case may be expressed through the polls. 
This result has important implications for the political economy of public 
schooling and the provision of public goods more broadly. The results imply that 
personal disappointment or negative outcomes provide a strong motivation to vote among 
higher-income and past election participants. This suggests that the optimal political 
strategy for those seeking re-election may be to minimize losses to subgroups of higher-
income constituents. Even within income or within voting propensity, if negative 
outcomes disproportionately increase voter turnout, then policies that hurt a minority but   26
benefit the majority may be politically unviable.  Within the provision of education as a 
public good, these results also bring into question predictions of public good provision 
based on a median voter model or any rational choice model of voter behavior. Concepts 
of efficient sorting, equilibrium quality provision, optimal allocation, and mechanism 
design in a public school choice program need to consider the political viability of public 
school programs designed to increase competition and school quality under public school 
choice. School district policies that seek to increase school quality provision or choice 
options to less advantaged communities at a cost to a minority of affluent constituents 
may not be politically feasible.     27
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Table I:  November 4, 2003 School Board Election: At-large Candidates  
Candidate Name  Occupation  Important Issues 
Votes 
Received 
Kaye McGarry  Business Owner/ Author/ 
Speaker 
Reprioritize budget so that more is 
spent on teachers and less on 




Joe (Coach) White  Retired Football Coach  Increase funding, increase community 
involvement and improve relationship 
with School Board 
 
31,360 










and Tenured Professor, 
Current School Board Chair 
 
Enhance teacher quality and 
compensation, improve student 
achievement for all groups of students 
30,602 
Mike Kasper  Controller  Simplified and transparent budget, 
establishment of ‘Neighborhood 
Schools Zones’ that are permanent 
 
24,863 




Larry Bumgarner  Information Not Available  Information Not Available 
 
14,886 





Social worker/ Drop-out 
counselor  
Accountability system that assesses 
quality of education for each child not 
just based on test scores, empower 




Fred Marsh  Retired Small Businessman  Higher test scores, lower drop out rates 
 
5,054 
Nick Holley  Campaign Manager for Kim 
Holley for US Congress  
Reducing mobile classroom units, 
increasing CMS student achievement 
standards 
4,544 
Notes: Top three candidates won the election. ***Wilhelmenia Rembert was incumbent chair who lost the election by 402 votes.  
Data Sources: Election totals are from Mecklenburg County Board of Elections. Candidate information taken from the candidates' 
written information about themselves and their positions as printed in the Charlotte Advocates for Education voting guide for the 
November 4, 2003 election. 
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Voters in 2003 
Election 
Demographics:      
Percent White  58.04%  71.12%  73.65% 
Percent Female  51.14%  54.94%  55.32% 
Own Block-group and Race    
Median Income in 2000 Census  $50,579  $61,294  $66,261 
Party Affiliation:      
 Percent Democrat  ---  42.69%  45.80% 
 Percent Republican  ---  35.59%  39.52% 
Total N  736,815 427,133  97,258 
Notes: Data from Mecklenburg County Board of Elections March 2004 Voter file and North Carolina State Board of 








Table III:  Student Characteristics  
  All Students  Randomized  
Student Demographics:    
Black 41.2%  53.9% 
Female 49.6%  51.4% 
Free or Reduced Lunch  33.1%  37.8% 
Own Block-group and Race 
Median Income in 2000 Census  $55,670  $53,012 
Choice School Characteristics:    
Average Combined Scores  0.051  0.085 
   Percent Free or Reduced Lunch  36.3%  36.6% 
Home School Characteristics:    
Average Combined Scores  -0.074  -0.205 
   Percent Free or Reduced Lunch  41.0%  47.4% 
Number of Students  92,789 9,408 
Notes: Data from Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools. Statistics on All Students taken from the 
2002-2003 school year. Randomized groups include students in 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 
school lotteries for whom lottery number alone determined assignment. 
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Table IV:  The Impact of Random Assignment to First-Choice School on Attrition 
 Mean 
Regression Adjusted Difference: Lottery 
Winners vs. Lottery Losers 










0.141 -0.025**  -0.057***
  -0.013  2002-2003 and 2003-2004 Randomized Groups: Not 
Present in Fall 2003 Student Census   (0.009)  (0.017)  (0.009) 
   N=9,408  N=3,344  N=6,064 
        
0.158 -0.021  -0.054**  -0.005  2002-2003 Lottery Randomized Groups: Not Present in Fall 
2003 Student Census    (0.011)  (0.020)  (0.012) 
   N=6,452  N=2,243  N=4,209 
        
0.103 -0.029 -0.063  -0.025  2003-2004 Lottery Randomized Groups: Not Present in Fall 
2003 Student Census    (0.015)  (0.033)  (0.014) 
   N=2,956  N=1,101  N=1,855 
Notes: Each entry in the table is from a separate regression of an indicator of attrition on whether the student was assigned to her first-choice school, 
controlling for lottery-block fixed effects and the following baseline covariates: black (for All Students only), female, free- or reduced-lunch status, 
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Student Characteristics:      
White 0.326  0.337  0.007 
     (0.009) 
Female 0.519  0.521  0.0001 
     (0.013) 
Free or Reduced Lunch  0.353  0.423  -0.031* 
     (0.014) 
Own Block-group and Race   $51,659  $52,295  212.580 
Median Income 2000 Census      (526.713) 
      
Home School Characteristics:      
Average Combined Score  -0.227  -0.214  0.006 
       (0.008) 
Percent Free or Reduced Lunch  0.488  0.479  -0.001 
       (0.005) 
Percent Black  0.529  0.525  -0.006 
       (0.005) 
      
Prior Household Voting Behavior:  0.211 0.206  0.009 
Household Voted in 2001      (0.011) 
      
N 3,478  4,607  8,085 
Notes: Adjusted difference reports the coefficient on whether the student was assigned to her 
first-choice school from separate regressions with each variable in the first column as the 
dependent variable, controlling for lottery-block fixed effects. Standard errors adjust for 
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Table VI: The Impact of Winning or Losing the Lottery on Voting in 2003 Election 
Dependent Variable:  
Indicator if at least one member of student’s 










Randomized Outcome:      
Lost Lottery  0.131 0.327*  -0.036 
  (0.095) (0.139)  (0.135) 
Student Baseline Characteristics:      
White    0.239*  --  -- 
  (0.096) --  -- 
Female  -0.016 0.010  -0.045 
    (0.082) (0.120)  (0.106) 
Free or Reduced Lunch      -1.016***      -11.975***      -1.071*** 
  (0.260) (0.758)  (0.294) 
        Median Income (demeaned)      0.007***      0.011***    0.005 
  (0.002)  (0.003)    (0.003) 
Household Voted in 2001       3.086***       2.624***      3.471*** 
  (0.087) (0.112)  (0.126) 
   
Mean of Dependent Variable  0.227 0.367  0.166
Total Observations  7,365 2,432  4,602
Log Pseudolikelihood  -2114.496 -930.437  -1004.351
Notes: Conditional (fixed-effects) logit estimation with lottery-block fixed effects; standard errors adjust for clustering at 
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Table VII: Specification Checks 
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Student Baseline Characteristics:    
 
 
White 0.690  0.332  0.317***  0.0006 
     (0.024)  (0.023) 
Female 0.501  0.520  -0.016  -0.027 
     (0.010)  (0.026) 
Free or Reduced Lunch  0.195  0.393  -0.280***  -0.044 
     (0.046)  (0.028) 
Median Income (Demeaned)  16.655  1.021  13.524***  0.363 
     (1.509)  (1.783) 
Household Voted in 2001  0.317  0.208  0.129***  0.004 
     (0.016)  (0.023) 
        
N 7,966  8,085  16,051  13,988 
Notes: Adjusted difference reports the coefficient on whether the student was in the status-quo group from separate regressions with each 
variable in the first column as the dependent variable, controlling for lottery-block fixed effects. Standard errors adjust for clustering at the 
lottery-block level. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.05, **=.01, ***=.001). 
   38
 
Table IX: Weighted Results of Losing the Lottery Versus Status-quo on Voting 
 
OLS Estimation 
Dependent Variable: Indicator if at least 
one member of student’s household 
voted in 2003 election 
OLS Estimation 
Dependent Variable: Number of 
members of student’s household who 




















Lost Lottery  0.037* 0.086*** 0.007  0.051** 0.122*** 0.010 
  (0.014) (0.025)  (0.010)  (0.019) (0.035)  (0.013) 
           
Status-quo Group  0.004 -0.011  0.028  0.006 0.003  0.028 
  (0.022) (0.041)  (0.015)  (0.028) (0.052)  (0.020) 
           
Total Observations  13,988  6,876  7,112  13,988 6,876 7,112 
Adjusted R-squared  0.4036  0.3916  0.4347  0.4751 0.4567  0.4988 
Notes: OLS estimation with lottery-block fixed effects; standard errors adjust for clustering at the lottery-block level. Asterisks 
indicate significance (*=.05, **=.01, ***=.001). Regressions include baseline controls: race, gender, median income, voting 
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Table X: The Impact of Losing the Lottery on Voting: Interactions of Lottery Outcomes with Race, 
Income, Prior Voting History, and School-Level Academics 
Dependent Variable: 
Indicator if at least one member of student’s 
household voted in 2003 election 
 
(1)  (2) 
 
 
(3)  (4) 
 
         
Randomized Outcome:         
Lost Lottery  0.120  -0.018  -0.030  -0.029 
 (0.126)  (0.138)  (0.151)  (0.151) 
Lost Lottery*White   -0.022  -0.045  -0.046  -0.045 
 (0.172)  (0.168)  (0.167)  (0.166) 
Lost Lottery*Median Income   0.010*  0.010*  0.010*  0.010* 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Lost Lottery*Median Income Squared  -0.00007  -0.00006  -0.00006  -0.00006 
 (0.00006)  (0.00006)  (0.00006)  (0.00006) 
Lost Lottery*Voted in 2001  --  0.347*  0.345*  0.345* 
  --  (0.164)  (0.164)  (0.164) 
Lost Lottery*(Score First Choice – Score 









        
Won Lottery*(Score First Choice – Score 









        
Lost Lottery*(Score Home School – Score 









         
Total Observations  7,365 7,365 7,365  7,365
Log Pseudolikelihood  -2111.204 -2108.712 -2108.476  -2108.374
Notes: Conditional (fixed-effects) logit estimation with lottery-block fixed effects; standard errors adjust for clustering at the 
lottery-block level. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.05, **=.01, ***=.001). Regressions include baseline controls: race, gender, 
median income, median income squared, voting history, free- and reduced-lunch status, and all school level academic variables 
that are interacted with winning or losing the school choice lottery.   40
 
Table XI: Relationship Between Precinct-Level Election Results and Losing the Lottery 
   
Dependent Variable: Precinct fraction of 
votes against incumbent in 2003 election  (1) (2)  (3) 
Constant 0.078***  -0.011  0.0002 
 (0.017)  (0.045)  (0.047) 
      
0.916*** 0.929***  0.908***  Precinct Fraction of Votes Against 
Incumbent in Prior Election  (0.026) (0.038)  (0.041) 
      
0.437***  0.392**  0.278  Precinct Fraction of Students Who Are 
White and Lost the Lottery  (0.124)  (0.135)  (0.171) 
      
--  0.090*  0.097 
Precinct Fraction White  --  (0.044)  (0.051) 
      
--  0.106*  0.113* 
Precinct Fraction Free or Reduced Lunch  --  (0.051)  (0.054) 
      
--  -0.0001  -0.0001 
Precinct Average Median Income  --  (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
      
School Board District Fixed Effects  No  No  Yes 
      
R-squared 0.9150  0.9182  0.9212 
N 186  186 186 
Notes: Weighted OLS regression estimation with robust standard errors. Observations (precincts) are weighted by total voter 
turnout in the precinct in 2003 election. Asterisks indicate significance (*=.05, **=.01, ***=.001). 
 
 
 
 
 